The theoretical literature on exchange of indivisible goods …nds natural application in organizing the exchange of live donor kidneys for transplant. However, in kidney exchange, there are constraints on the size of feasible exchanges. Initially, kidney exchanges are likely to be pairwise exchanges, between just two patient-donor pairs, as these are logistically simpler than larger exchanges. Furthermore, the experience of many American surgeons suggests to them that preferences over kidneys are approximately 0-1, i.e. that patients and surgeons should be largely indi¤erent among healthy donors whose kidneys are compatible with the patient. This is because, in the United States, transplants of compatible live kidneys have about equal graft survival probabilities, regardless of the closeness of tissue types between patient and donor.
Introduction
straightforwardly reveal their preferences. And, using tissue typing statistics from the Caucasian patient population, we showed that the bene…ts of such an exchange could be very substantial, increasing live organ donations between unrelated donors from about 54% to as much as 91% if multiple-pair exchanges are feasible, and to as much as 75% even if only pairwise exchanges are feasible. 5 However in our subsequent discussions with medical colleagues, aimed at organizing such exchanges in the New England region of the transplant system, it became clear that a likely …rst step will be to implement pairwise exchanges, between just two patient-donor pairs, as these are logistically simpler than exchanges involving more than two pairs. That is because all transplantations in an exchange need to be carried out simultaneously, for incentive reasons, since otherwise a donor may withdraw her consent after her intended recipient receives a transplanted kidney. 6 So even a pairwise exchange involves four simultaneous surgical teams, operating rooms, etc. Furthermore, the experience of American surgeons suggests to them that preferences over kidneys can be well approximated as 0-1, i.e. that patients and surgeons should be more or less indi¤erent among kidneys from healthy donors that are blood type and immunologically compatible with the patient. 7 This is because, in the United States, transplants of compatible live kidneys have about equal graft survival probabilities, regardless of the closeness of tissue types between patient and donor (Gjertson and Cecka (2000) and Delmonico (2004) ). 8 The present paper explores how to organize such exchanges. The theoretical groundwork for kidney exchange without a constraint on the size of exchanges, explored in Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004), was laid in the papers by Shapley and Scarf (1974) , Roth and Postlewaite (1977) , Roth (1982a) , and Abdulkadiro¼ glu and Sönmez (1999) . The constrained exchange problem studied in the present paper is closely related to elegant results from graph theory, which will prove very useful, in ways recently pioneered by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) . They looked at a problem of pairwise matching with 0-1 preferences on two-sided graphs, i.e. on graphs in which the parties to the exchange 5 Subsequent investigation of a database constructed by Dr. Susan Saidman of Massachusetts General Hospital, of patients who had an incompatible donor (and who were consequently on the waiting list for a cadaver kidney), showed that 18% of them could participate in live donor exchanges involving only paired exchanges among patient-donor pairs in the database, and 27% could receive transplants if larger exchanges among them were feasible. 6 For legal reasons related to the NOTA, it seems unlikely that legally binding contracts can be written about the future provision of a live donor kidney. 7 Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) , on whose work the present paper builds, refer to such preferences (in settings quite di¤erent than kidney exchange) as dichotomous. That the surgeons with whom we are working on implementing kidney exchange have approximately dichotomous preferences was brought to our attention when we began to work with Dr. Saidman's database of current patients with incompatible donors, and as we began developing software to identify potential matches for the New England program. 8 This is contrary to the "European" view which maintains that the graft survival rate increases as the tissue type mismatch decreases. See Opelz (1997 Opelz ( , 1998 ).
can be a-priori divided into two sets, e.g. into buyers and sellers, each of which can only trade with the other. Bipartite graphs cannot be used to model kidney exchange, since any patient-donor pair might potentially exchange with any other. The present paper therefore generalizes such a model to the case of arbitrary graphs. While the constraint that only pairwise exchanges be conducted means that the number of live donor transplants that can be arranged by exchange is smaller than if larger exchanges are feasible, it is still substantial. And, in the constrained problem, e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanisms will be shown to exist. This class of mechanisms includes deterministic mechanisms that would accommodate the kinds of priority setting that organ banks currently use for the allocation of cadaver organs, and which therefore may be especially appealing to transplant organizations. Also included are random matching mechanisms, such as the egalitarian mechanism, a stochastic mechanism that arises in connection with elementary notions of distributive justice.
Related Literature
This paper intersects with the literatures on transplantation, graph theory, and mechanism design.
The idea of paired kidney exchange between one incompatible patient-donor pair and another was …rst proposed by Rapaport (1986) and then again by Ross et al (1997) . UNOS initiated pilot testing of a paired kidney exchange program in 2000, and the same year the transplantation community issued a consensus statement indicating that the paired kidney exchange program is considered to be "ethically acceptable" (Abecassis et al (2000) ). 9 While the transplantation community approved the use of kidney exchanges to increase live kidney donation, it has provided little guidance about how to organize such exchanges. Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004) proposed an e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanism that uses both pairwise and larger exchanges. The present paper di¤ers from Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004) in two major ways: We only consider exchanges involving two patients and their donors, and we adopt the assumption of many American transplant surgeons (including those we are working with in New England) that each patient is indi¤erent between all compatible kidneys (cf. Gjertson and Cecka (2000) and Delmonico (2004) ). These two assumptions considerably change the mathematical structure of the kidney exchange problem, and e¢ cient exchange becomes an application of what is known in the graph theory 9 Another kind of exchange proposed in the transplantation literature is an indirect exchange between an incompatible patient-donor pair and a patient on the cadaveric waitlist (in return for a high priority on the waitlist for the donor's patient; Ross and Woodle (2000) ). Zenios (2002) focuses on the mix of direct and indirect exchanges that maximizes the welfare of the candidates in the participating pairs, whereas Zenios, Woodle, and Ross (2001) propose preferential selection of O blood-type donors of patients with multiple donors to reduce the adverse a¤ect of indirect exchange programs on patients with no donors. Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004) explore how more elaborate forms of direct and indirect exchange can increase the potential bene…ts of kidney exchange.
literature as the cardinality matching problem (see for example Korte and Vygen (2002) ). 10 For this purpose consider an undirected graph whose vertices each represent a particular patient and her incompatible donor(s), and whose edges connect those pairs of patients between whom an exchange is possible, i.e. pairs of patients such that each patient in the pair is compatible with a donor of the other patient. Finding an e¢ cient matching then reduces to …nding a maximum cardinality matching in this undirected graph (see Lemma 1), a problem well analyzed in this literature. More speci…cally the Gallai (1963 Gallai ( , 1964 )-Edmonds (1965) Decomposition Lemma (henceforth GED Lemma) characterizes the set of maximum cardinality matchings. Technical aspects of our contribution heavily build on the GED Lemma.
We …rst concentrate on deterministic outcomes, and show that there exists a wide class of e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanisms that accommodate the kinds of priority setting that organ banks currently use for the allocation of cadaver organs. We then allow stochastic outcomes as well, and show that there exists an e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanism, the egalitarian mechanism, which equalizes as much as possible the individual probabilities of receiving a transplant. If stochastic mechanisms can be accepted by the transplantation community, this mechanism can serve as a basis for discussion of how to address equity issues while achieving e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness. Our paper builds on the closely related recent paper by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) . They considered two-sided matching i.e. matching between two sets of agents that can be speci…ed exogenously (e.g. …rms and workers), such that an agent on one side of the market can only be matched with an agent on the other side (cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) ), modeled as a bipartite graph, with 0-1 preferences. It was their paper that made us aware of some of the graph-theoretic results that we also use here. Our results on the egalitarian mechanism generalize their corresponding results to general, not necessarily bipartite graphs. Kidney exchange cannot be modelled as a two-sided market, since any patient with incompatible donors can potentially be matched with any other. 11 The extensions to the general case are of interest not only because of the importance of the application to kidney exchange , but also because of the insights they give into pairwise exchange in general graphs, and the technical challenges that the generalization to arbitrary graphs presents. 10 If we instead only consider exchanges involving two pairs (as in this paper) but assume strict preferences over com- Teo and Sethuraman (2000) . 11 Note that, since each donor comes to the exchange in the company of his incompatible patient, there isn't an option of modeling a two-sided market in which the sides are donors and patients. There is a very small population of undirected donors, who wish to donate but not to a speci…c patient, and such a formulation might be applicable to them, but we do not consider such unattached donors here.
Pairwise Kidney Exchange
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be a set of patients each of whom has one or more incompatible donors. Each patient is indi¤erent between all compatible donors and between all incompatible donors, except she strictly prefers her donor(s) to any other incompatible donor, and any compatible donor to her own donor(s). Since we are considering only pairwise exchanges in this paper, the above assumptions induce the following preference relation % i for patient i over the set of patients N :
1. For any patient j with a compatible donor for patient i we have j i i, 2. for any patient j without any compatible donor for patient i we have i i j;
3. for any patients j; h each of whom has a compatible donor for patient i we have j i h;
4. for any patients j; h neither of whom has a compatible donor for patient i we have j i h:
Here i denotes the strict preference relation and i denotes the indi¤erence relation induced by % i . A (pairwise kidney exchange) problem is a pair (N; %) where %= (% i ) i2N denotes the list of patient preferences. Throughout the paper with the exception of the proofs of the results on incentives, we …x a problem (N; %).
We consider the case in which an exchange can involve only two pairs. Patients i; j 2 N are mutually compatible if i j j and j i i. That is, two patients are mutually compatible if each one has a donor whose kidney is compatible for the other patient.
A matching : N ! N is a function such that: (i) = j if and only if (j) = i for any pair of patients i; j 2 N . A matching is individually rational if for any patient i 2 N , (i) 6 = i implies (i) i i. Let M be the set of individually rational matchings for the problem (N; %). Throughout the paper we consider only individually rational matchings. That is, exchange is possible only between mutually compatible patients. A matching denotes an individually rational matching throughout the rest of the paper.
For each matching 2 M and patient i 2 N , (i) = i means that the patient i remains unmatched. 12 For any matching 2 M and pair of patients i; j 2 N , (i) = j means that patient i receives a compatible kidney from a donor of patient j and patient j receives a compatible kidney from a donor of patient i. Since exchange is possible only among mutually compatible pairs, it is 12 A patient who is unmatched does not receive a live-donor transplant, nor does her donor donate a kidney. Such a patient may wait for a cadaver kidney, or the patient and incompatible donor may participate in an exchange arranged at a later date when other incompatibe patient-donor pairs have become available. Note that when a patient is matched, only one of her donors donates a kidney (no matter how many incompatible donors the patient has).
su¢ cient for our purposes to keep track of the symmetric jN j by jN j mutual compatibility matrix R = [r i;j ] i2N;j2N de…ned by
for any pair of (not necessarily distinct) patients i; j 2 N .
We will refer to the pair (N; R) as the reduced problem of (N; %). Occasionally it will be helpful to think of the reduced problem as a graph G = (N; R) whose vertices N are the patients (and their incompatible donors), and whose edges R are the connections between mutually compatible pairs of patients; i.e. there is an edge (i; j) 2 R if and only if r i;j = 1. (It will be clear from the context whether R is the mutual compatibility matrix or the set of edges indicating mutual compatibility.)
A matching then can be thought of as a subset of the set of edges such that each patient can appear in at most one of the edges. With this alternative representation if (i; j) is an edge in the matching , patients i and j are matched by and, if patient i does not appear in any edge in the matching , she remains unmatched.
A mechanism is a systematic procedure that selects a matching for each problem. A matroid is a pair (X; I) such that X is a set and I is a collection of subsets of X (called the independent sets) such that
E¢ cient Exchange

M1
if I is in I and J I then J is in I; and Proposition 1 Let I be the sets of simultaneously matchable patients, i.e. I = fI N : 9 2 M such that I M g. Then (N; I) is a matroid.
For any matching 2 M, let j j = jM j = jfi 2 N : (i) 6 = igj denote the number of patients who are matched with another patient. The following well known property of matchings, which follows immediately from the second property of matroids, states that the same number of patients will receive a transplant at every Pareto-e¢ cient matching.
Lemma 1 For any pair of Pareto-e¢ cient matchings ; 2 E, j j = j j.
If exchange is possible among more than two pairs, the conclusion of Lemma 1 no longer holds.
Example 1 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and suppose preferences are such that
Consider the following two Pareto e¢ cient trades: Two patients receive transplants if the …rst trade is carried out whereas three patients receive transplants if the second trade is carried out.
Priority Mechanisms
The experience of transplant centers is mostly with the priority allocation systems used to allocate cadaver organs. It is therefore natural to consider how priority mechanisms would function in the context of live kidney exchange.
A priority ordering is a permutation of patients such that the k th patient in the permutation is the patient with the k th priority. Without loss of generality let the priority ordering of patients be the natural ordering (1; 2; :::; n), i.e. patient k is the k th priority patient for each k.
While we will concentrate on ordinal priorities here, priorities may depend on quanti…able patient characteristics such as the patient's "percent reactive antibody"(PRA), which is correlated with how di¢ cult it will be to …nd a compatible kidney for that patient. (So it might be desirable, for example, for a high PRA patient to have a high priority for a compatible kidney in the relatively rare event that one becomes available.) In general, we will say that a non-negative function : N ! R + is a priority function if it is increasing in priority, i.e. if (i) (i + 1). Consider a transplant center T whose decision makers wish to …nd the set of exchanges that maximizes a preference T de…ned over matchings (more speci…cally, over sets of matched patients).
We will say that T is a priority preference if it is responsive to the priority ordering (Roth, 1985) , i.e. if T whenever M M , or when M and M di¤er in only one patient, i.e.
M nM = fig; M nM = fjg, for some i; j 2 N , and i < j. That is, whenever M and M di¤er in only one patient, the matching with the higher priority patient is preferred, and adding additional matched patients to an existing matching always results in a preferred matching. (For a given priority ordering of patients, there remain many possible priority preferences T over sets of matched patients.)
A priority mechanism produces a matching as follows, for any problem (N; R) and priority ordering (1; 2; :::; n) among the patients:
e. the set of all matchings).
In general for k n, let E k E k 1 be such that
For a given problem (N; R) and priority ordering (1; 2; :::; n), we refer to each matching in E n as a priority matching, and a priority mechanism is a function which selects a priority matching for each problem. A priority matching matches as many patients as possible starting with the patient with the highest priority and following the priority ordering, never "sacri…cing" a higher priority patient because of a lower priority patient. By construction, a priority matching is maximal, and hence Pareto-e¢ cient, i.e. E n E. Proposition 1 implies, through the second property of matroids, that the "opportunity cost"of matching a higher priority patient will never be more than one lower priority patient who could otherwise have been matched. (For example, there might be two patients each of whom is mutually compatible only with the same third patient, and so matching the higher priority of the two patients will preclude matching the lower priority patient. But it cannot happen that, by matching a higher priority patient, two lower priority patients are excluded who otherwise could both have been matched.) And of course, by Lemma 1, the same total number of patients will be matched at each Pareto-e¢ cient matching, so there is no trade-o¤ between priority allocation and the number of transplants that can be arranged. In the matroid literature, a priority mechanism is called a greedy algorithm (since it "greedily"takes the highest priority remaining patient at each stage). The following proposition by Rado (1957) and Edmonds (1971) from the matroid literature will be helpful in understanding the resulting priority matchings.
Proposition 2 For a matroid (N; I) and any priority function on N , a priority matching (obtained by a greedy algorithm with respect to ) identi…es an element M of I that maximizes P i2I (i) over all I 2 I.
Example 1 shows that if larger exchanges were permitted, the conclusions of Proposition 2 would not carry over (e.g. suppose that patient 4 has the highest priority, so the priority mechanism chooses the pairwise trade even if the 3-way trade has a higher sum of priorities).
For ordinal priorities, Proposition 2 allows us to quickly prove the following corollary, which helps explains the appeal that priority algorithms may have to transplant centers accustomed to prioritizing their patients.
Corollary 1 For any priority preference T a priority matching maximizes T on the set of all matchings, i.e.
T for all 2 M.
Incentives in priority mechanisms
We turn next to consider the incentives facing patients (and their surgeon advocates) in a priority matching mechanism. Two apparently di¤erent issues arise that turn out to be closely related. The …rst has to do with patients who have multiple incompatible donors willing to donate on their behalf. We show that a patient maximizes her chance of being included in an exchange by revealing all of her willing donors. The second issue involves revealing which compatible kidneys the patient is willing to accept. Again, we show that a patient maximizes her chance of being able to take part in an exchange by accepting her full set of compatible kidneys. That is, we show that with respect to both donors and kidneys, priority mechanisms do not give participants perverse incentives, but rather make it a dominant strategy to fully reveal which willing donors are available, and which kidneys are acceptable.
These two conclusions have the same cause. A patient enlarges the set of other patients with whom she is mutually compatible by coming to the exchange with more donors, and by being able to accept a kidney from more of those other patients'donors. And a patient's probability of being included in an exchange is monotonic in the set of other patients with whom she is compatible.
For a given set of patients and their available donors, the basic data for the problem (N; R) is determined by the tissue typing laboratory. So, once each patient has revealed a set of donors, the tissue typing lab establishes for each patient i a set of compatible kidneys
But a kidney exchange is a complicated event involving a patient and a donor on each side of the exchange, and so there will be no way to prevent a patient from declining a medically compatible kidney (e.g. for logistical reasons such as location of the other patient-donor pair, or, for that matter, for unspeci…ed reasons related e.g. to the preferences of the patient's donor). So the strategy set of each agent (i.e. each patient and donor, or each surgeon acting on behalf of a patient) is the set of all possible subsets of acceptable kidneys A i K i that she might declare. (A kidney that is declared not acceptable can be thought of as being incompatible for reasons not initially revealed by the medical data.) A mechanism can only arrange exchanges between patient-donor pairs who are willing to accept each other's donor kidneys. A mechanism is strategy-proof in this dimension if a patient's probability of being included in an exchange with a compatible donor is maximized by declaring truthfully that A i = K i . 13 That is, a patient would have an incentive to declare a smaller acceptable set A i K i only if this could cause the mechanism to include the patient in an exchange when truthful revelation of preferences (A i = K i ) would not. The …rst part of Theorem 1 states that a patient can never bene…t by declaring a compatible kidney to be unacceptable under a priority mechanism.
14 The second part states the similar result for revelation of available donors.
Theorem 1 A priority mechanism makes it a dominant strategy for a patient to reveal both a) her full set of acceptable kidneys; and b) her full set of available donors.
The proof of Theorem 1 a) is contained in the Appendix. The proof of part b) follows quickly from the proof of part a). In particular, a mechanism is donor-monotonic if a patient never su¤ers from the addition of one additional (incompatible) donor for her. The addition of one extra donor for a patient has the e¤ect of enlarging her set of mutually compatible patients. But the proof of part a) of Theorem 1 shows that a patient never su¤ers from enlarging her set of mutually compatible patients in a priority mechanism, which therefore implies that priority mechanisms are donor monotonic in pairwise kidney exchange.
Corollary 2 A priority mechanism is donor-monotonic.
It is worth emphasizing some limits on what these results establish. When multiple potential donors prove to be incompatible, there may be complex family preferences involved in going forward with an exchange, e.g. a family might prefer to have a sibling donate a kidney to its patient only after the possibility of a parent's donation had been exhausted, and such a family might prefer to initially look for an exchange by only revealing the availability of the parent as a donor. Theorem 1 b) does not rule out this possibility. Similarly, it might be that, even if a patient is willing to accept all compatible kidneys, her donor is for some reason unwilling to donate a kidney to some of the patients who are compatible with him (i.e. with his kidney), which would reduce the set of acceptable kidneys in a way not precluded by Theorem 1 a). 15 What Theorem 1 does establish is that a priority mechanism introduces no new reasons for available donors to be concealed, or compatible kidneys to be rejected.
Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition
The structure of Pareto-e¢ cient pairwise matchings has been an active area of research in combinatorial optimization. Understanding this structure will yield additional insight into priority mechanisms and also allow us to apply a central concept in distributive justice -egalitarianism -to pairwise kidney exchange. The following partition of the set of patients is key to the structure of the set of Pareto-e¢ cient matchings. Partition N as fN
t. r i;j = 1 , and
N U is the set of patients for each of whom there is at least one Pareto-e¢ cient matching which leaves her unmatched. N O is the set of patients each of whom is not in N U (i.e., each of whom is matched with another patient at each Pareto-e¢ cient matching) but is mutually compatible with at least one patient in N U . N P is the set of remaining patients (i.e., the set of patients who are matched with another patient at each Pareto-e¢ cient matching and who are not mutually compatible with any patient in in N U ).
Consider the reduced problem (N; R). For I N , let R I = [r i;j ] i2I;j2I . We refer to the pair (I; R I )
as the reduced subproblem restricted to I. A reduced subproblem (I; R I ) is connected if there exists a sequence of patients i 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i m (possibly with repetition of patients) such that r i k ;i k+1 = 1 for all k 2 f1; 2; :::; m 1g and I = fi 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i m g : A connected reduced subproblem (I; R I ) is a component of (N; R) if r i;j = 0 for any i 2 I and j 2 N nI: We refer to a component (I; R I ) as an odd component if jIj is odd and as an even component if jIj is even. The following result due to Gallai (1963 Gallai ( , 1964 and Edmonds (1965) is central to our paper:
Lemma 2 (Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Lemma) Let (I; R I ) be the reduced subproblem with I = N nN O and let be a Pareto-e¢ cient matching for the original problem (N; R).
For any patient
15 Donations of cadaver organs are often carried out under a screen of anonymity. This will be more di¢ cult in the case of live donor exchange, since the full medical history of each donor will be an essential part of such exchange. That is, the e¢ cient matchings each leave unmatched jDj N O patients, each one in a distinct odd component. Note that Lemma 1 is an immediate corollary to the GED Lemma as well. 16 Edmonds (1965) introduced the …rst polynomial-time algorithm for construction of a Pareto-e¢ cient matching and construction of partition fN U ; N O ; N P g of N . Faster algorithms were introduced in later dates. An excellent survey of combinatorial matching theory including matching algorithms are given in Lovász and Plummer (1986).
The Induced Two-Sided Matching Market
Loosely speaking there is competition at two levels: At the …rst level, odd components (of underdemanded patients) compete for overdemanded patients. With the addition of an overdemanded patient to an odd component, all the patients in the augmented odd component can be matched to one another. The second level of competition is between the members of odd components that do not secure an overdemanded patient. If the odd component is of size one, its member will remain unmatched, but members of each larger odd component compete against each other not to be the one patient in the component who remains unmatched.
In this subsection we focus on the …rst level of competition, between odd components for overdemanded patients. Since this competition does not involve perfectly matched patients (who are all matched to one another at every e¢ cient outcome), we will not need to consider them for this discussion. Instead, we focus on an "induced" two-sided market, one side consisting of the overdemanded patients, and the other side consisting of the (odd) components of underdemanded patients. A pre-matching is a function~ :
LetM denote the set of pre-matchings. A pre-matching~ 2M is e¢ cient if it assigns each overdemanded patient i 2 N O to an odd component J 2 D. LetẼ be the set of e¢ cient prematchings. Note thatẼ is non-empty by the GED Lemma.
Priority Mechanisms Revisited
The GED Lemma allows us to see in detail how competition for compatible kidneys plays out in priority mechanisms. The outcome of a priority mechanism is Pareto-e¢ cient and by the GED Lemma, each overdemanded as well as each perfectly matched patient is matched at each Paretoe¢ cient matching. So the competition in a priority mechanism is among the underdemanded patients. Moreover, for any odd-component J and any patient j 2 J, it is possible to match all patients in
Jn fjg among themselves. So a priority mechanism determines which odd components will be fully matched (one member with an overdemanded patient and remaining patients with each other) and which odd components will have all but one of its patients matched (all with each other). This will depend on the relative priority ordering among the set of patients each of whom is the lowest priority patient at an odd component. That is, each overdemanded patient in C (J ; I) is mutually compatible with at least one patient in S J2J J. Which odd components will be fully matched and which ones will have all but its lowest priority member matched will be determined by the hierarchy among the odd components (where the priority of an odd component is determined by the priority of its lowest priority member) together with the following version of Hall's Theorem (Hall (1935) ):
There exists a pre-matching which matches all odd components in J with a distinct overdemanded patient in N O if and only if
Under the priority mechanism, odd components D 1 ; D 2 ; :::; D p are considered one at a time and the following iterative procedure will determine which odd components will have all its members matched and which ones will have all but its lowest priority member matched.
Step < jfD 1 gj = 1, then let J 1 = ; and in this case all members of D 1 except its lowest priority patient`1 will be matched.
In general, at
Step k:
and in this case all members of D k will be matched.
and in this case all members of D k but its lowest priority patient`k will be matched.
Stochastic Exchange
So far our emphasis has been on deterministic exchange. One important tool to achieve equity in resource allocation problems with indivisibilities is using lotteries and allowing for stochastic outcomes. 18 A lottery = ( ) 2M is a probability distribution over the set of matchings M. For each matching 2 M, 2 [0; 1] is the probability of matching in lottery , and P
2M
= 1: Let L be the set of lotteries for the problem (N; %). A stochastic mechanism is a systematic procedure that selects a lottery for each problem. Given a lottery 2 L, the allocation matrix A ( ) = [a i;j ( )] i2N;j2N summarizes the total probability that patient i will be matched with patient j for any pair of patients i; j 2 N . Note that two distinct lotteries can induce the same allocation matrix. Let A be the set of all allocation matrices for the problem (N; %) : That is, A = fA ( )g 2L .
Each lottery (and hence each allocation matrix) speci…es the probability that each patient will receive a transplant. Given a lottery 2 L, de…ne the utility of patient i to be the aggregate probability that she receives a transplant. Given 2 L, the induced utility pro…le is a non-negative real vector u ( ) = (u i ( )) i2N such that u i ( ) = P j2N nfig a i;j ( ) for any patient i 2 N . Let U be the set of all feasible utility pro…les for the problem (N; %) : That is, U = fu ( )g 2L .
A lottery is ex-post e¢ cient if its support is a subset of the set of Pareto-e¢ cient matchings.
That is, lottery 2 L is ex-post e¢ cient if > 0 implies 2 E. An allocation matrix A 2 A is ex-ante e¢ cient if there exists no allocation matrix B 2 A such that Pre-matchings, pre-lotteries and pre-allocations will be very useful in our analysis.
The Egalitarian Mechanism
It is rare that a cardinal representation of preferences, i.e. a utility function, has a direct interpretation in a resource allocation problem. In the present context, however, a patient's utility corresponds to the probability that she receives a transplant, and thus equalizing utilities as much as possible becomes very plausible from an equity perspective. This approach is widely known as egalitarianism in distributive justice. 19 In this section we analyze the egalitarian mechanism. The GED Lemma will be key to the construction of egalitarian utilities.
Recall that C (J ; I) denotes the neighbors of the set of odd components J D among overde-
Recall that at most one patient in each odd component remains unmatched at every Pareto-e¢ cient matching and therefore no more than jJ j patients among patients in S J2J J can remain unmatched at any Pareto-e¢ cient matching. Consider a situation where only overdemanded patients in I N O are available to be matched with underdemanded patients in S J2J J. By de…nition of a neighbor, underdemanded patients in S J2J J can only be matched with overdemanded patients in C (J ; I) I and therefore at least (jJ j jC (J ; I)j) of these patients remain unmatched at a Pareto-e¢ cient matching (provided that jJ j jC (J ; I)j). 20 Therefore if only overdemanded patients in I N O are available to be matched with patients in S J2J J, the quantity f (J ; I) is an upper-bound of the utility (i.e. the probability of receiving a transplant) of the least fortunate patient in S J2J J, 19 The two most related economic applications of egalitarianism to our setup are Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) and Dutta and Ray (1989) . 20 For the sets of odd components J that we consider below, jJ j > jC (J ; I)j. Step 1:
In general, at
Step k: Let
For each j 2 N U , let k(j) be the step at which the odd component that contains patient j leaves the above procedure. That is, k(j) 2 f1; 2; :::; qg is such that j 2 J 2 D k(j) :
We construct the egalitarian utility pro…le
as follows:
Theorem 2 The egalitarian utility pro…le u E is a feasible utility pro…le.
Theorem 2 states that for each of the collections of under and overdemanded patients (D k ; N O k ) in the above construction, the overdemanded patients can be probabilistically matched to all of the indicated odd components of underdemanded patients, in lotteries that divide the resulting probabilities equally among the underdemanded patients, and thus achieve the upper bound on the utility of the least fortunate patients.
We next present an example that illustrates the construction of the egalitarian utilities.
Example 2 Let N = f1; : : : ; 16g be the set of patients and consider the reduced problem given by the graph in Figure 1 . Each patient except 1 and 2 can be left unmatched at some Pareto e¢ cient matching and hence N U = f3; : : : ; 16g is the set of underdemanded patients. Since both patients 1 and 2 have links with patients in N U , N O = f1; 2g is the set of overdemanded patients. 22 Therefore the set of odd components is D = fD 1 ; : : : ; D 6 g where D 1 = f3g, D 2 = f4g, D 3 = f5g, D 4 = f6; 7; 8g, D 5 = f9; 10; 11g, D 6 = f12; 13; 14; 15; 16g. Note that the egalitarian utility of members of the 3-patient odd components D 4 ; D 5 is at least 2/3. That is because any two of the three can be matched among themselves, by the GED Lemma. Similarly the egalitarian utility of each member of the 21 If there are multiple sets that minimizes f , their union minimizes f as well and we pick the largest such set as the arg min. See Lemma 4 in the Appendix for a proof of this result. 22 Since perfectly matched patients do not play an active role in determining the egalitarian utilities, we consider an example with no such patients. 5-patient odd component D 6 is at least 4/5. These observations are helpful for constructing the egalitarian utility pro…le.
, none of the multi-patient odd components is an element of D , the 5-patient odd component D 6 is not an element of Hence the egalitarian utility pro…le is u E = (1; 1; A utility pro…le is Lorenz-dominant if and only if it Lorenz-dominates every other utility pro…le.
If it exists, a Lorenz-dominant utility pro…le is e¢ cient and as "evenly"distributes the probability of receiving a transplant among patients as possible constrained by the mutual compatibility constraints.
Theorem 3
The egalitarian utility pro…le u E is Lorenz-dominant.
We illustrate Theorem 3 with a simple example. 
, and
showing that u E Lorenz dominates any other e¢ cient utility pro…le. Since each ine¢ cient utility pro…le is Lorenz dominated by any e¢ cient utility pro…le that Pareto dominates it (and since Lorenz domination is transitive), u E Lorenz dominates any utility pro…le.
We refer to any lottery that induces the egalitarian utility pro…le as an egalitarian lottery. Similarly we refer to any allocation matrix that induces the egalitarian utility pro…le as an egalitarian allocation matrix. We refer to a stochastic mechanism that selects an egalitarian lottery for each problem as an egalitarian mechanism.
Our next result states that, as for priority mechanisms, truthful revelation of private information is a dominant strategy under an egalitarian mechanism.
Theorem 4 An egalitarian mechanism makes it a dominant strategy for a patient to reveal both a) her full set of acceptable kidneys; and b) her full set of available donors.
As discussed when we proved the similar result for the priority mechanisms, the second part of the Theorem follows from the …rst. Revelation of the full set of acceptable kidneys increases the set of patients with whom a given patient is mutually compatible, and, for the same reason, a patient never su¤ers because of an addition of one more incompatible donor. That is:
Corollary 4 An egalitarian mechanism is donor-monotonic.
Concluding Remarks
One of the most challenging steps in implementing new market designs is addressing the constraints that arise in the …eld. Because all surgeries in a kidney exchange must be done simultaneously, even the simplest exchange, between two patient-donor pairs, requires four simultaneous surgeries among the two donors and two recipients. It therefore seems likely that some transplant centers are correct in anticipating that they will, at least initially, only be able to proceed with exchange among two pairs. Ünver (2004, 2005) showed that, even under this constraint, implementing kidney exchange could substantially increase the number of live organ kidney transplants. The present paper shows that when exchange is constrained in this way, and when the 0-1 nature of American surgeons' preferences regarding compatible/incompatible kidneys are taken into account, it is still possible to arrange exchange in an e¢ cient and incentive compatible manner.
Another challenge in implementing new market designs arises in meeting the perceived needs and desires of the institutions, organizations, and individuals who must adopt and use the new design. Here too, the results are encouraging, and we show that the kinds of priority allocation that already govern the allocation of cadaver kidneys can be adapted to work e¤ectively in organizing live donor kidney exchange. Since there are virtually no constraints on the kinds of priorities that can be used in an e¢ cient and incentive compatible mechanism, we anticipate that priority mechanisms may appeal to di¤erent transplant centers that do not necessarily agree on how patients should be prioritized.
Indeed, there is lively discussion and disagreement about, and frequent revision of the priorities that di¤erent kinds of patients should have for cadaver organs, and we don't doubt that similar discussions about live organ exchange will take place as exchange becomes more common. The debate about cadaver organs frequently refers to considerations of distributive justice, and in this connection we have discussed stochastic mechanisms of exchange, and the egalitarian mechanism in particular.
We do not anticipate or propose that this be taken as the last word on distributive justice in kidney exchange, but rather intend merely to show how the tools we assemble here can be used to address the kinds of distributional questions that arise. An interesting area of future research might be the extent to which egalitarian (and weighted-egalitarian) exchange mechanisms can be approximated by priority mechanisms with appropriately chosen priorities, taking into account di¤erent patients' likelihoods of …nding compatible donors with whom to exchange, the size and frequency of exchanges, etc., in the dynamic environment in which new patients and donors arrive, and exchanges are carried out periodically.
More generally, as economists start to take a more active role in practical market design, we often …nd we have to deal with constraints, demands, and situations di¤erent than those that arise in the simplest theoretical models of mechanism design. 23 In the present paper we address some of the issues that have arisen as we try to help surgeons implement an organized exchange of livedonor kidneys among incompatible donor-patient pairs. Not only do these issues appear to allow satisfactory practical solutions, they suggest new directions in which to pursue the underlying theory.
Appendix: Proofs
The proof of Proposition 1 is a standard exercise in combinatorial optimization theory, for example see Goemans (2004) . Proposition 2 is due to Rado (1957) and Edmonds (1971) . Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 are corollaries of the GED Lemma (Lemma 2) and see Lovász and Plummer (1986) for a proof of the GED Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1a): W.l.o.g. we will prove the theorem for the priority mechanism induced by the natural ordering. Let R be a reduced problem and k be a patient. If patient k is matched with another patient under (R), then she has nothing to gain by revealing only a subset of her full set of compatible kidneys. Suppose patient k remains unmatched under = (R) and let Q be a reduced problem obtained from R by patient k declaring some of her compatible kidneys to be incompatible.
Observe that this implies
as well and hence (k) = k completing the proof.
The following Lemma is useful to construct the egalitarian utility pro…le:
arg min J G f (J ; I) as well.
Proof of Lemma 4: Fix G D and I N
For all i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g de…ne
By de…nition we have jG 1 j + jG 2 j = jG 3 j + jG 4 j and n 1 + n 2 = n 3 + n 4 : Moreover
That is because, in the LHS of the inequality not only the neighbors of G 3 = G 1 \ G 2 (i.e. members of C 3 ) are counted twice but also there may be additional common neighbors of G 1 and G 2 ; RHS of the inequality accounts for the double counting of members of C 3 but not the remaining common neighbors of G 1 and G 2 .
Since G 1 , G 2 each minimize the function f ,
and hence
Adding the …rst two lines and subtracting the third line
and therefore f 1 n 4 n 4 jG 4 j + jC 4 j, or equivalently
But since G 1 minimizes f , we shall have f 4 = f 1 and hence
We next present two lemmata that will be useful in our proof for Theorem 2. Lemma 6 For each k 2 f1; 2; :::; qg, we have
Proof of Lemma 6: For any k 2 f1; 2; :::; qg, let J k = S J2D k J. Note that J k is the set of patients in sets of D k . Pick k 2 f1; 2; :::; q 1g.
ii We prove Lemma 6 (ii) by iteration on steps k 2 f1; 2; :::; qg of the construction.
First consider k = 1. We have
If D 1 = D, then q = 1 and we are done. Otherwise we proceed with k = 2.
Next consider k = 2: Consider the reduced subproblem N nN
implies that the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition for the reduced subproblem
J who is mutually compatible with a patient in N nN
is the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition for the reduced sub-
. Therefore, DnD 1 is the set of odd components of the reduced subproblem which is obtained by removing overdemanded patients from the reduced
. By Corollary 3, jDnD 1 j > N nN O 1 and at this point the proof of f D 2 ; N O 2 < 1 follows from the same sequence of arguments as in k = 1:
and we are done. Otherwise, we iteratively proceed in a similar way with k = 3, and so on. 
Also note that for each k 2 f1; 2; :::; qg and J 2 D k we have
We will show that u E is a feasible utility pro…le in two major steps: In the …rst step (Claim 1),
we will show that it is possible to assign overdemanded patients N O to odd components D such that each odd component J 2 D is assigned with an overdemanded patient with an aggregate probability of J . In the second step (Claim 2) we will show that for each odd component We will show this by de…ning an auxiliary task assignment problem and applying Hall's Theorem to the auxiliary task assignment problem. 24 Given N 
tasks. Let T J be the set of identical tasks associated with set J, and T = S
Finally, introduce a matrix = x;T x2X;T 2T such that x;T = 1 ifr i;J = 1 for x 2 X i and T 2 T J ; and x;T = 0 otherwise: Intuitively agent x is …t to perform task T if and only if patient i associated with agent x has a link with the odd component J that is associated with task T in the induced two-sided matching market N O ; D;R .
Given N O k and D k we refer to (X; T ; ) as the auxiliary task assignment problem. Note that
An auxiliary task assignment is a bijection : X ! T . An auxiliary task assignment is feasible if and only if (x) = T implies that x;T = 1.
Here is the point of introducing the above auxiliary task assignment problem: Each agent or task in X [T corresponds to a fraction
Therefore if we show that there exists a feasible auxiliary task assignment , this would mean that it is possible to assign each agent in X to a distinct compatible task in T ; and therefore the aggregate N O k :
weight of the patients in N O k can be allocated among odd components of D k such that the share of the odd component J is S
We next prove that there exists a feasible auxiliary task assignment for the above task assignment problem. Given T de…ne C( ; X) = x 2 X : 9T 2 with x;T = 1
That is, C( ; X) is the set of agents each of whom is …t to perform at least one of the tasks in : By
Hall's Theorem there exists a feasible auxiliary task assignment if and only if j j jC( ; X)j for every T :
That is, no matter what subset of tasks is considered, the number of agents who are …t for at least one of these tasks should be no less than the number of the tasks in this subset. We will prove this by contradiction.
Suppose there exists a subset T of tasks such that j j > jC( ; X)j. Next construct the following set of tasks . For any task T 2 , include all tasks which are identical to task T in set . Note that since C( ; X) = C( ; X); we have j j j j > jC( ; X)j = jC( ; X)j
Let J D k be the set of odd components each of which is associated with a task in . Note that S J2J T J = and therefore
By Eq (2), Eq (3), and Eq (4)
rearranging the terms, we have
and therefore,
Lemma 6, and this together with Eq (5) imply that
contradicting the de…nition of D k and showing that for each T we have j j jC( ; X)j. Therefore, there exists a feasible auxiliary task assignment by Hall's Theorem. 
where the last equality holds by Eq (1). Moreover for each overdemanded patient i 2 N O k ; we have X
We conclude the proof of Claim 1 by constructing a pre-allocation matrixÃ 2Ã using the matrices By the GED Lemma, there exists at least one such matching. Pick one and only one such matching for each of the Q J2D u (~ ) jJj possible combinations: Let M(~ ) be the resulting set of matchings. Clearly jM(~ )j = Q J2D u (~ ) jJj : We are …nally ready to construct a lottery E which induces the utility pro…le u E . The lottery E is constructed from the pre-lottery~ by simply replacing each pre-matching~ in the support of with the uniform lottery over M(~ ). That is:
Clearly, E is a lottery:
Moreover, by construction E is an ex-post e¢ cient lottery.
We conclude the proof of Claim 2 and Theorem 2 by showing that u(
Each patient in N nN U is matched with another patient in every e¢ cient matching by the GED Lemma. Since E is ex-post e¢ cient, for each patient i 2 N nN U we have
Let~ 2M be a pre-matching with~ ~ > 0: 
Therefore
Here the fourth equality follows from Eq (7) and the sixth equality follows from Eq (1). This completes the proof of Claim 2 as well as the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3 : Let J k = S J2D k J for any k 2 f1; 2; :::; qg.
for each k 2 f1; 2; :::; q 1g. Proof of Claim 1: Pick k 2 f1; 2; :::; q 1g.
Consider the construction of
and D k is the largest subset J D / S k 1 =1 D`satisfying this equality, we have
Rearranging the terms in this inequality, we …nd 
is the highest sum of utilities that can be received by the lowest utility jJ 1 j+1 patient in
is the highest sum of utilities that can be received by the lowest utility jJ 1 j+2 patient in J 1 [ J 2 ; : : :, and proceeding in a similar way with patients in J 3 ; : : : ; J q , we show that the utility pro…le u E Lorenz dominates any other feasible utility pro…le.
The next Lemma will be useful in proving Theorem 4: This implies that induces w = (w i ) i2N 2 U.
Next, we show that w Lorenz-dominates v. By the de…nition of order statistics, for any t 2 f1; 2; :::; ng and any t member subset N 0 N of patients we have
Moreover, since u Lorenz-dominates v,
P t s=1 u (s) for any t 2 f1; 2; :::; ng and this inequality holds strictly for some t 2 f1; 2; :::; ng. This together with the de…nition of order statistics imply that for any t 2 f1; 2; :::; ng and any t member subset N 00 N of patients we have
where the second inequality holds strictly for some t 2 f1; 2; :::; ng. We have P t s=1 w (s) = P i2N 0 v i + (1 ) P i2N 00 u i for some N 0 ; N 00 N with jN 0 j = jN 00 j = t. Therefore, Eq (8) and Eq (9) imply that where the inequality holds strictly for some t 2 f1; 2; :::; ng, completing the proof of Lemma 7:
Proof of Theorem 4: First we introduce some additional notation. Fix the set of agents N and hence each mutual compatibility matrix R de…nes a distinct reduced problem. For any reduced problem R, let
J and e (R) = max 2M(R) j j :
Recall that for any 2 M(R), we have 2 E(R) () j j = e (R). For any reduced problem R and any two sets I; J N , de…ne neighbors of J among I as C (J; I; R) = fi 2 I n J : r i;j = 1 for some j 2 Jg :
For a singleton set J = fjg, we slightly abuse the notation and use C(j; I; R) instead of C(fjg; I; R). For any patient j 2 (N O (R) [ N P (R)) we have u E j (R) = 1 and therefore no such patient can bene…t by underreporting her set of compatible patients. Let j 2 N U (R) be such that j 2 J 2 D (R).
Let
Note that u E j (R) < 1. We will prove that patient j cannot increase her utility by declaring a mutually compatible patient to be incompatible, and repeated application of this argument will conclude the proof.
Let j 0 2 C (j; N; R). Either j 0 2 J or j 0 2 N O (R). Let Q be the reduced prob- , and the egalitarian utility pro…le u E (Q). Note that u E (Q) = u E (Q). We will prove three claims that will be useful in our proof.
Claim 1:
(i) e (Q) = e (R),
(ii) E (Q) E (R) and 2 E (R) \ M (Q) ) 2 E (Q).
Proof of Claim 1:
(i) Since M (Q) M (R) we have e (Q) e (R). Since j 2 N U (R), there exists a Pareto-e¢ cient matching 2 E (R) such that (j) = j. We have j j = e (R) and 2 M (Q) which implies e (Q) j j = e (R). Therefore e (Q) = e (R).
(ii) First let 2 E (Q). We have 2 M (Q) M (R). Moreover j j = e (Q) and e (Q) = e (R) by Claim 1 (i) implying that j j = e (R). Therefore 2 E (R).
Next let 2 E (R) \ M (Q).
Since 2 E (R), we have j j = e (R) = e (Q) and this together with 2 M (Q) imply 2 E (Q). Next pick a patient i 2 N U (Q). There exists a Pareto-e¢ cient matching 2 E (Q) such that h 2 N U (R) as well. In a way of speaking, the utility of patient j increases under E (Q) with respect to E (R) at the expense of the utility of some other patients each of whom is underdemanded under R. That is, some utility is transferred from some underdemanded patients under R to patient j. We partition N U (R) as n S k =1 J`(R) ;
Consider patients in S q(R) =k+1 J`(R) : By the construction of u E (R), at any matching 2 E (R)
in the support of E (R), any patient in S q(R) =k+1 J`(R) either remains unmatched or she is matched with another underdemanded patient in S q(R) =k+1 J`(R) or is matched with an overdemanded patient in S q(R) =k+1 N Ò (R). Since patients in S k =1 J`(R) are handled before patients in S q(R) =k+1 J`(R) during the construction of u E (R), there is no patient in S k =1 J`(R) that is mutually compatible with any patient in S q(R) =k+1 N Ò (R). Since any patient in S k =1 J`(R) and any patient in S q(R) =k+1 J`(R) are in di¤erent odd components, there is no patient in S k =1 J`(R) that is mutually compatible with a patient in S q(R) =k+1 J`(R), either. Therefore for any i 2 S k =1 J`(R) ; we have
Therefore, patients in S q(R) =k+1 N Ò (R) shall be committed for patients in S q(R) =k+1 J`(R) under the pro…le Q as well, and therefore the aggregate utility of patients in S q(R) =k+1 J`(R) cannot decrease under Q. Since aggregate utility remains constant at e (Q) = e (R), and since only patients in N U (Q) N U (R) can have a utility reduction,
